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THE UNINTENDED LESSONS IN BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION +
DERRICK A. BELL, JR.*
I want to talk about learning the lessons that the decision in
Brown v. Board of Education1 could not teach.  I note that the title of
the symposium, “Brown Is Dead? Long Live Brown!,” places a ques-
tion mark after “Brown Is Dead.”  I would like to replace the ques-
tion mark with a period.  The Brown decision, as far as the law is
concerned, is truly dead and beyond resuscitation.  The question is
why on its fiftieth anniversary Brown is not only remembered, but
hailed as a landmark?  Why, unlike thousands of other cases de-
cided by the Supreme Court, its fiftieth anniversary is being cele-
brated and commemorated in the media, and in dozens of
conferences and symposiums.
In 1970, courts finally began ordering enforceable school de-
segregation orders that went beyond the “grade-a-year” and “free-
dom of choice” plans that reflected a determination to retain
segregated schools as long as possible.  It was about that time that
Yale Law School Professor Alexander Bickel, a constitutional law
scholar, predicted that over time Brown would lose its viability.  He
said:
This is not to detract from the nobility of the Warren
Court’s aspiration in Brown, nor from the contribution to
American life of the rule that the state may not coerce or
enforce the separation of the races.  But it is to say that
Brown v. Board of Education, with emphasis on the educa-
+ This essay is based on a talk given at Brown Is Dead?  Long Live Brown!: A
Commemorative Symposium at New York Law School, New York, April 26, 2004.  The talk
was based on Professor Bell’s book, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM (2004).
* Visiting Professor, New York University School of Law.  LL.B. University of
Pittsburgh Law School, 1957; A.B. Duquesne University, 1952.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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tion part of the title, may be headed for — dread word —
irrelevance.2
At the time, we civil rights lawyers criticized Professor Bickel’s pre-
diction, but he proved more right than we were.  Even today, many
civil rights advocates, despite facts that are as heart-rending as they
are undeniable, maintain that Brown was and is a valuable prece-
dent.  They are entitled to their views — but they fit quite nicely
with those who hold that the earth is, after all, flat.
There is a kind of solace in finding continuing meaning in
Brown that avoids the hard-eyed conclusions that UCLA law Profes-
sor Cheryl Harris reaches with regard to contemporary race juris-
prudence.3  She starts from the assumption that Brown is irrelevant,
and asserts that, in at least two respects, current civil rights law ap-
proximates the jurisprudence of the era following Reconstruction
when Plessy v. Ferguson4 was decided.
First, Professor Harris argues the Supreme Court seems to have
adopted many of the specific forms of “racial erasure” that were
prominent in the period of so-called Southern Redemption.  Racial
erasure is called upon and resuscitated in interpretations of the
Equal Protection Clause that assigns the federal government a
subordinate role relative to that of the states in protecting the right
to be free from discrimination.5
In support of her argument, Professor Harris cites the Court’s
ruling in United States v. Morrison,6 striking down the section of the
Violence against Women Act that authorizes civil actions against
perpetrators of gender motivated violence.  Asserting both federal-
ism and state sovereignty concerns, the Morrison Court found that
the federal government lacked the power to enforce anti-discrimi-
nation laws against individuals, as opposed to state actors.  In doing
so, the Court ignored a luminous record of the states’ failure to
protect victims of sexual assault.  The Morrison Court reached back
2. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 150-51
(1978).
3. Cheryl I. Harris, Mining in Hard Ground: The Miner’s Canary, 116 HARV. L. REV.
2487 (2003) (book review).
4. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
5. Harris, supra note 3, at 2490.
6. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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to The Civil Rights Cases,7 an 1883 decision invalidating the first fed-
eral public accommodations law, for its interpretation of the Four-
teenth Amendment.  In so doing, the Court embraced the same
states’ right logic that constituted the bedrock of the segregation-
ists’ platform.
Second, Professor Harris says that, like the Plessy Court in 1896,
the current Court insists that all racial identities are symmetrical
and hold no special social significance.  Indeed, under the guise of
color-blindness, this Court has naturalized and evacuated race as a
matter of law.  The result is that the Court now treats all race con-
scious efforts to eradicate racial inequality as conceptually
equivalent to acts designed to install racial hierarchy.
Brown ’s demise is apparent even beyond an analysis of legal
doctrine.  A quick review of the current statistics on the resegrega-
tion of public schools shows that the implementation of Brown,
through the mechanisms of racial balance and busing, was a failure.
Despite hundreds of school desegregation suits, many lasting for
decades, most black and Latino students still attend public schools
that are both racially separate and educationally ineffective.
A study issued in 2003 by Gary Orfield’s pro-integration
Harvard Civil Rights Project, reported that as of the 2000-2001
school year, white students, on average, attend schools where 80%
of the student body is white.8  Many, if not most, predominately
black and Latino schools have substantially inferior resources to
those provided to white schools in the same school system: teachers
are less experienced in the minority schools, students have more
behavioral problems, and academic out-put is almost uniformly
poor.9
So, you may ask, what can we learn from our fifty years of expe-
rience with the Brown decision?  I think there are several lessons
that are far more accessible now than they were when Brown was
decided.
7. See United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
8. See Erica Frankenberg, Chungmei Lee & Gary Orfield, The Civil Rights Project
at Harvard Univ., A Mutiracial Society with Segregated Schools: Are We Losing the Dream?
(2003), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/reseg03/
AreWeLosingtheDream.pdf.
9. See id.
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LESSON 1
Brown was not a revolutionary decision.  Rather, it is the defini-
tive example that the interest of blacks in achieving racial justice is
accommodated only when and for so long as policymakers find that
the interest of blacks converges with the political and economic in-
terests of whites.  Black people have been challenging segregation
in the public schools since 1850 — for the most part without suc-
cess.  As Professor Mary Dudziak has convincingly argued, the
Brown decision advanced U.S. interests because racial segregation
was hampering the United States in the Cold War with communist
nations and undermining U.S. efforts to combat subversion at
home.10  Indeed, the NAACP brief in Brown argued that the sepa-
rate-but-equal precedent of Plessy is not only unjust to blacks, but
also bad for the country’s image, a barrier to the development in
the South, and harmful to its foreign policy.11
The amicus briefs filed by the Justice Department were the
ones that really hammered away at how important it was that the
Court strike down public school segregation.  To emphasize this
point, the government included a lengthy quote from Secretary of
State Dean Acheson in its brief:
During the past six years, the damage to our foreign rela-
tions attributable to race discrimination has become pro-
gressively greater.  The United States is under constant
attack in the foreign press, over the foreign radio, and in
such international bodies as the United Nations because
of various practices of discrimination against minority
groups in this country.12
Acheson argued that “the undeniable existence of racial discrimina-
tion gives unfriendly governments the most effective kind of ammu-
nition for their propaganda warfare” and that school segregation
had been “singled out for hostile foreign comment in the United
10. See MARY DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY (2000).
11. Brown was handed down during the McCarthy era.  It is significant that the
phrase “Under God” in the pledge of allegiance was inserted by Congress in 1954 as an
anti-Communist measure.
12. See DUDZIAK, supra note 10, at 100 (quoting Brief for the United States as Ami-
cus Curiae at 7, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
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Nations and elsewhere.”13  He concluded that “racial discrimina-
tion in the United States remains a source of constant embarrass-
ment to this Government in the day-to-day conduct of its foreign
relations; and it jeopardizes the effective maintenance of our moral
leadership of the free and democratic nations of the world.”14
While there is no record that foreign policy was debated by the
Brown Justices in conference, Professor Dudziak has found speeches
by both Justice Warren and Justice Douglas, bewailing segregation’s
adverse effect on U.S. foreign policy.  Surely, Justice Frankfurter
and the other members of the Court were able to draw a connec-
tion between the foreign policy difficulties described by Secretary of
State Acheson — the fears of subversion at home that were ex-
ploited during the Joseph McCarthy era — and the barriers to
black freedom and equality that were widely trumpeted abroad dur-
ing the war.
Brown is the definitive — but far from the only — example of
interest convergence at work.  The nineteenth century equivalent
of Brown was the Emancipation Proclamation.  President Lincoln’s
priority was saving the Union, not freeing the slaves.  He signed the
Emancipation Proclamation when he recognized that it would im-
prove the Union’s chances in the Civil War by disrupting the Con-
federate workforce and discouraging European nations,
particularly England and France, from siding with the Confederacy.
After Lincoln turned the Civil War into a war to free the slaves, as
well as to save the Union, European abolitionists made certain that
their governments did not enter the war on the side of the Confed-
eracy.  The Emancipation Proclamation also opened the way for the
Union to enlist thousands of former slaves who made the difference
in many battles, although with very heavy casualties.
A century later, political and business leaders lobbied for the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.  They
recognized that televised images of southern police forces violently
attacking sit-in protesters and marchers had generated widespread
support for these measures.  According to University of Virginia law
Professor Michael Klarman, their support for civil rights legislation,
after decades of ignoring the injustice of racial segregation was in-
13. Id. at 100-01.
14. Id. at 101.
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evitable because of a variety of deep-seated, social, political, and ec-
onomic forces that would have undermined racial segregation
whether or not the Supreme Court had intervened in Brown.  Pro-
fessor Klarman acknowledges that while Brown acted as a catalyst for
the civil rights legislation of the 1960s, it did not do so for the rea-
sons commonly cited.15
LESSON 2
Interest convergence is far more important to gaining relief
from racial injustice than the degree of harm suffered by blacks or
the character of proof offered to demonstrate racial harm.  The ef-
forts over many years to get Congress to enact anti-lynching laws is
an excellent example.  Such legislation was never enacted despite
the thousands of black people killed in horrible ways over several
decades.16
It is just as easy to find contemporary examples of racial injus-
tices about which society is aware, but is manifestly uninterested in
remedying.  There is the refusal of Congress or the Executive
Branch to alter the federal sentencing guidelines that have resulted
in large disparities in the sentences handed out to blacks and Span-
ish speaking people compared to whites who are convicted in drug
cases.17  Another example is a recent study that shows that almost
one half of black men from ages sixteen to sixty-four in New York
City are unemployed, with roughly 35% of these men out of the job
15. See Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80
VA. L. REV. 7 (1994); see also MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2003).
16. See JAMES ALLEN ET AL., WITHOUT SANCTUARY: LYNCHING PHOTOGRAPHY IN
AMERICA (2000); see also WALTER WHITE, ROPE AND FAGGOT: A BIOGRAPHY OF JUDGE
LYNCH (1929); ROBERT L. ZANGRANDO, THE NAACP CRUSADE AGAINST LYNCHING, 1909-
1950 (1980).
17. The Supreme Court in United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), by a 5-4
vote, found that the seventeen-year-old federal sentencing guidelines violated the Sixth
Amendment by allowing judges to increase sentences above guideline maximums based
on facts not decided by a jury.  The complex decision did not strike down the guide-
lines, but found them to be advisory, rather than mandatory.  The decision restored to
judges the sentencing discretion they lost to the mandatory guidelines, but it created a
host of new problems regarding who is entitled to resentencing and what will constitute
a reasonable sentence in the future.
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market and no longer looking for employment.18  Massive unem-
ployment is certainly a factor in the large percentage of black men
in prison for non-violent drug offenses.  There is, however, virtually
no public outrage about these statistics.  At least there is no outrage
compared to the crisis that would be proclaimed if conditions in
mostly white suburbs were generating similar statistics.
LESSON 3
Even when interest convergence results in a potentially effec-
tive racial remedy, that remedy will be abrogated as soon as it
threatens the superior societal status of whites, particularly those in
the middle and upper classes.  For example, when southerners re-
sponded to the first Brown decision in 1954 with massive resistance,
neither Congress nor the White House showed any interest taking
the political risk of upholding the law of the land.  With no support
from the other branches of government forthcoming, the Court is-
sued its second Brown decision in 195519 that withdrew its earlier
commitment to desegregation by setting a standard for compliance
— the “all deliberate speed” standard — that was so vague that it all
but halted the implementation of the first Brown decision for at
least fifteen years.
You would never know it from the opposition and determined
resistance of so many whites, but the Brown decision was actually a
good deal for white Americans.  Professor Louis Michael Seidman
explains how Brown brought about a transformation without real
change.  As he views it, the Brown Court faced a massive contradic-
tion between the nation’s oft-cited commitment to equality and the
great value that whites placed on the racial preferences and priori-
ties that were tacitly approved in Plessy.  Given black Americans’
lack of political and economic power, it appeared that their de-
mand for equality could never be satisfied.  For both foreign and
domestic policy reasons, however, something needed to be done.
As Professor Seidman puts it, the “[c]ontradictions in the ide-
ology of the separate-but-equal doctrine were permanently destabi-
18. See MARK LEVITAN, COMMUNITY SERVICE SOCIETY, A CRISIS OF BLACK MALE EM-
PLOYMENT: UNEMPLOYMENT AND JOBLESSNESS IN NEW YORK CITY, 2003 (2004), at http://
www.cssny.org/pubs/special/2004_02labormarket.pdf.
19. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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lizing and threatened any equilibrium.”20  By purporting to resolve
those contradictions, Brown served to end their destabilizing poten-
tial.  The Court, Seidman claims:
resolved the contradictions by definitional fiat: separate
facilities were now simply proclaimed to be inherently un-
equal.  But the flip side of this aphorism was that once
white society was willing to make facilities legally non-
separate, the demand for equality had been satisfied and
blacks no longer had just cause for complaint.  The mere
existence of Brown thus served to . . . legitimate current
arrangements.  True, many blacks remained poor and dis-
empowered.  But their status was now no longer a result
of the denial of equality.  Instead, it marked a personal
failure to take advantage of one’s definitionally equal
status.21
The Brown decision’s rejection of the racial barriers imposed by seg-
regation, then, reinforced the fiction that the path of progress was
clear.  Everyone could and should succeed through individual abil-
ity and effort.  One would think that this reinforcement of the polit-
ical and economic status quo would have placated, if not pleased,
even the strongest supporters of segregation.  After all, blacks did
not demand, nor did the Court offer any damages or reparations
for the harm and loss caused by decades of segregation.
Rather than accept a good deal, however, white politicians
used the Brown decision to enrage large groups of white people —
initially in the South, but also in the North as efforts to implement
the decision moved across the country.  In effect, whites demanded
the name “segregation,” as well as the game of white racial prefer-
ence.  Initially, the federal courts responded cautiously to white re-
sistance in an effort to allow time for the process of desegregation
to work.  But, over time, the courts issued a series of stronger and
more specific orders that were intended to assert their judicial au-
thority as much as to carry out the mandate of Brown.  These orders
were implemented eventually, but white parents’ fear of sending
their children to desegregated schools drove many of them either
to move to mainly white school districts or to enroll their children
20. Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673, 717 (1992).
21. Id.
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in all-white private schools.  The primary reason for racial balance
remedies departed right along with those white families.
It is interesting, although far from encouraging, to compare
white opposition to the Brown decision with the violent reaction of
whites who opposed the Emancipation Proclamation.  Ignorant or
uncaring of the fact that Lincoln’s action would greatly benefit the
Union, whites rioted in New York City and elsewhere after the
Emancipation Proclamation was issued — killing innocent black
people and destroying property.  In the mid-term elections, many
whites voted against the Republicans.  After the Union army won
the Civil War with substantial help from freed blacks, however, op-
position by southern whites and disinterest by northern whites lead
to the abandonment of Reconstruction policies.  These actions un-
dermined the political and economic gains blacks were making,
and opened the way to massive violence against any blacks deemed
not to know their place.  This history-wide pattern of white resis-
tance to policies that nominally address racial injustices, but are
substantively more valuable to whites and the nation, can be ob-
served today in widespread white opposition to affirmative action
policies.  Those policies are directly and indirectly more valuable to
whites and to the country’s well-being than they are to blacks.
One of the characters in the old radio series The Shadow was a
superhero who could become invisible because he had the power to
cloud men’s minds.  Racism has a similar power to cloud American
minds.  Racism prevents many whites from understanding that they
are the major beneficiaries of civil rights policies; and many blacks
rely on and defend those policies with little appreciation for what
motivated their issuance and how vulnerable they are to withdrawal
when conditions change.
LESSON 4
The Brown decision encouraged post World War II challenges
to segregation in public transportation and facilities.  Of course, as
Michael Seidman and others have suggested, there were multiple
forces that combined to undermine the most stark aspects of racial
segregation after World War II.  These positive developments
should not, however, prevent us from acknowledging that Brown
was a disaster for the schooling of black children.
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Dr. W.E.B. Du Bois accurately predicted that the South would
not comply with the Brown decision for many years: “long enough
to ruin the education of millions of black and white children.”22  I
was not aware of Dr. Du Bois’s warning in the early 1960s when I
was litigating school desegregation suits at the NAACP LDF, and
had I known about it, I would not have accepted it.  At that time, I
believed that my work on school desegregation might prove to be
the high point of my career.  I was wrong.  The implementation of
the court orders that I helped obtain resulted in the closing of
black schools and the dismissal of thousands of black teachers and
administrators.  When the black children who were the benefi-
ciaries of those court orders were admitted previously to all whites
schools, they often faced hostility, and only infrequently found a
teaching environment that was conducive to their needs.
Desegregated schools adopted tracking mechanisms that
placed most blacks on non-academic tracks.  Black children were
disproportionately disciplined, and there was little consideration
given to black cultural interests.  Moreover, despite the priority
given to white students, their parents either refused to enroll them
in desegregated schools or removed them from those schools as
soon as they were able.  Alas, there is no reason to speak of these
educational outrages in the past tense.  These policies are still fol-
lowed in all too many supposedly desegregated schools.
For these and several other reasons that I have suggested, a
Brown decision that mandated the full enforcement of the equal
portion of the separate-but-equal doctrine rather than one striking
that doctrine down, might have better advanced the education of
black as well as white children.  Such a result would have appeared
to be a devastating defeat to the civil rights lawyers who had per-
sisted in their struggle against segregation for over twenty years, but
it would have led to a better outcome in the long run.
Why, you might ask, try to remake history a half-century after
the fact?  I do so with far more pain than pleasure.  I do so in order
to demystify court ordered racial remedies — and, in fact, all racial
justice policies — that promise far more in relief than they can de-
22. W.E.B DU BOIS, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF W.E.B. DU BOIS: A SOLILOQUY ON
VIEWING MY LIFE FROM THE LAST DECADE OF ITS FIRST Century  333 (1968).
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\49-4\NLR401.txt unknown Seq: 11 29-APR-05 9:23
2005] THE UNINTENDED LESSONS IN BROWN 1063
liver.  Racism is still the glue that holds our society together — de-
spite its tremendous disparities in wealth, income, and opportunity.
Brown gets undeserved credit for desegregating public facilities
other than schools.  That process was encouraged by Brown, but it
was not the decisive factor.  In fact, prior to Brown, some southern
states were already working to equalize black schools — admittedly
in hopes of avoiding a desegregation order.  The process of setting
requirements and standards for the equalization of public schools
was already underway when Brown was decided.  The addition of
integrated monitoring teams and a requirement of black commu-
nity representation on school boards would likely have enhanced
the efforts of the black teachers and administrators who had la-
bored for decades in inadequate facilities, but with some success.
Without Brown, perhaps politicians would not have been able to
rally white support for the massive resistance campaign that turned
the South into a closed society for more than a decade.  In order to
gain and remain in office, even moderate politicians like Alabama
Governor George Wallace and Arkansas Governor Orville Faubus,
became all-out segregationists.  Maybe that would not have hap-
pened if the Court had recognized, as some of the briefs submitted
in Brown argued, that black kids were not the only ones hurt by
segregation.  Indeed, white kids were harmed as well: both in the
quality of their schools, even though they were far superior to the
facilities provided for blacks, and also because segregation instilled
in them the sense that they were superior.
Paradoxically, an order to equalize black and white school fa-
cilities would likely have hastened school districts’ voluntary deseg-
regation efforts because of the high cost of maintaining two
equalized school systems.  Dual school systems were expensive to
maintain even when they were not equal.  In many of my desegrega-
tion cases, school board members would defend the constitutional-
ity of their practices and lie about their schools being equal.  Then
during the break, however, they would sidle over to me in the hall
and whisper, “You know I had to say those things on the stand, but
I’m glad you are all down here, because we can’t afford two sets of
schools.”
Commenting on the debate over separate versus integrated
schools in 1935, Dr. Du Bois observed that “Negro children need
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neither segregated schools nor mixed schools.  What they need is
education.”23  The good news today is that educators and parents
are ignoring the siren song that integration is an essential compo-
nent of a good school.  Resisting pressure from public school offi-
cials, teacher’s unions, and some civil rights experts, educators and
parents are working to provide black children with effective school-
ing based on their needs.  Looking beyond schools, there are hun-
dreds of after-school and supplemental school programs, where
dedicated individuals are developing students’ talents in the arts
and sports.  These programs enable black and Spanish background
children to overcome multiple disadvantages and perform above av-
erage on standardized tests.  They are stepping stones to college
and to brighter futures than the students in them would otherwise
have enjoyed.
These programs are applauded by all those who recognize that
effective schooling is of primary importance regardless of its source.
The Frederick Douglass Academy in West Harlem is one such pro-
gram.  Virtually all of the children who attend Douglass Academy
come from families that are poor enough to qualify for the free
breakfast and lunch programs.  The Academy has strict standards
and even higher expectations.  Douglass Academy students perform
above average on standardized tests, and most of them, according
to one official, attend college.  Schools like Frederick Douglass and
a great many other educational programs are proof that children
from impoverished neighborhoods need not be written off as lost.
The fifty-year long experience with Brown teaches that advo-
cates of racial justice must rely less on judicial decisions, and more
on tactics, actions, even attitudes that challenge the assumption of
white dominance.  History, as well as current events, calls for real-
ism in formulating racial tactics and strategies.  We must recognize
that while landmark decisions may be designed to address and
hopefully resolve deeply divisive social issues; they must be framed
in language that appears to do justice, without unduly upsetting
23. W.E.B. Du Bois, Does the Negro Need Separate Schools?, 4 J. NEGRO EDUC. 328
(1935); see generally Derrick A. Bell, The Legacy of W.E.B. Du Bois: A Rational Model for
Achieving Public School Equity for America’s Black Children, 11 CREIGHTON L. REV. 409
(1977).
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\49-4\NLR401.txt unknown Seq: 13 29-APR-05 9:23
2005] THE UNINTENDED LESSONS IN BROWN 1065
large groups whose non-compliance could frustrate relief efforts
and undermine judicial authority.24
For reasons that may not have been apparent to the members
of the Brown Court, their school desegregation decision has
achieved a far loftier place in legal history than is justified based on
its failure to reform the ideology of racial domination that Plessy
represented.  The decision in Brown was far more successful in rec-
ognizing racial injustices than it was in providing meaningful reme-
dies.  Most of the time we do not notice that advances in racial
justice neatly coincide with those periods when policymakers realize
that remedying racial injustice best suits the nation’s needs.  Fortu-
ity has been and remains a far more important factor in achieving
racial justice than any national commitment to freedom and justice
for all.
Because we do not understand the motivations behind the case
and overvalue its significance, the anniversary of Brown on May 17th
has become the flag day of the civil rights movement.  At that time
of year we gather, renew our commitment, and join in the strains of
“We Shall Overcome.”  Viewing Brown as a symbol of what might
have been, however, only serves to mask the continuing manifesta-
tions of inequality that divide us along lines of color and class.
These divisions are exploited to enable an uneasy social stability,
but at a cost that is no less onerous because it is all too obvious to
blacks, and all but oblivious to a great many whites.  We know that
the permanence of racism emanates from the determination of
whites to dominate blacks and other colored peoples with little re-
gard to the hidden, but no less real, costs of that dominance.  Given
the great disparities of income and wealth in the United States, ra-
cism is a necessary stabilizing force, serving as a substitute for
money and power for most whites.
Here is a truth that must energize us rather than cause us de-
spair.  Now we can continue the struggle against racism enlight-
ened by what we have learned in the half century since Brown was
decided.  The landscape for meaningful racial reform is neither
smooth nor easy.  History’s lessons have not been learned, and even
at this late date, may not be teachable.  Racial reforms that blacks
view as important, many whites oppose as a threat to their status
24. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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and an unfair effort to make them pay for wrongs committed by
neither they nor theirs.  Color-blindness is adopted as an easy way
to cover over racial issues with which the nation would rather not
wrestle, much less try seriously to resolve.  Color-blindness is an at-
tractive veneer that obscures flaws that will not correct themselves
simply by being hidden from view.
Brown is a dramatic instance of a decision that promised to cor-
rect deficiencies in justice that were far deeper than the Supreme
Court was able to understand.  Understanding those deficiencies
more fully, and suggesting how we should address them, is the
continuing challenge for civil rights advocates.  Once revealed as a
motivating factor, interest convergence can be transformed into
useful strategy.  Those that defended the University of Michigan’s
affirmative action plans, for example, utilized interest convergence
by promoting diversity as being in the self-interest of the Univer-
sity.25  Interest convergence was part of their strategy, planned for
in advance, rather than a happy coincidence recognized in retro-
spect.  Using the interest convergence model in planning and im-
plementing civil rights strategies may mean relying less on courts to
advance racial justice goals.  But, as individuals and groups, we have
to challenge the assumptions of white dominance and the presump-
tions of black incompetence.  We do so by refusing to accept white
dominance in our schools, places of work, our communities, and
yes, among those whites who consider us friends.  We have to show
a due regard for our humanity, and have to convey enlightenment
to some whites, deeply immersed in the still widespread beliefs of a
white dominated society.
Professor Robert Gordon of Stanford University, offers encour-
agement in this likely lifelong process when he reminds us that
things seem to change in history when people break out of their
accustomed ways of responding to domination by acting as if the
constraints on them are not real and they have the power to change
things.  Sometimes they can change things, although not always in
the ways they had hoped or intended.  But they cannot know
whether they have the power to change things until they try.
Preston Wilcox, the long time Harlem activist, restates
Gordon’s words in the form of a grass roots challenge:  “Nobody
25. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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can free us but ourselves.”  His admonition has meaning for every
aspect of life for African Americans, and all those deemed outsid-
ers.  Nowhere does it have greater relevance than the education of
our children.  Preston Wilcox’s truth is easier to acknowledge than
to act on.  But this, of course, is usually both the measure and the
challenge of truth.
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